This paper explores the effect of exclusionary "ethical investing" on corporate behavior in a risk averse, equilibrium setting. While arguments exist that ethical investing can inßuence a Þrm's cost of capital, and so affect investment, no equilibrium model has been presented to do so. We show that exclusionary ethical investing leads to "polluting" Þrms being held by fewer investors since "green" investors eschew polluting Þrms' stock. This lack of risk-sharing among "non-green" investors leads to lower stock prices for polluting Þrms, thus raising their cost of capital. If the higher cost of capital more than overcomes a cost of reforming (i.e., a polluting Þrm cleaning up its activities), then polluting Þrms will become socially responsible because of exclusionary ethical investing. A key determinant of the incentive of polluting Þrms to reform is the fraction of funds controlled by green investors. In our model, empirically reasonable parameter estimates indicate that more than 20% green investors are required to induce any polluting Þrms to reform. Existing empirical evidence indicates that at most 10% of funds are invested by green investors.
available to hold the stock of Þrms with polluting technologies, causing those share prices to fall to reßect that lost diversiÞcation.
We then allow Þrms with polluting technologies to make their technologies acceptable to green investors (i.e., reform), at a cost. Our most basic question is, will the presence of green investors cause Þrms to alter their corporate behavior, cleaning up their polluting technology? If so, then green investors' "ethical" behavior can be said to have economic impact.
If investors do have an impact on Þrms with polluting technologies, causing some of those
Þrms to reform, then there will be three types of Þrms in the market: acceptable Þrms with clean technologies, unacceptable Þrms with unreformed polluting technologies and acceptable Þrms with reformed polluting technologies. Acceptable Þrms may be held by both neutral and green investors, while only neutral investors will hold unacceptable Þrms.
We assume that Þrms act to maximize share price. Holding the total number of investors constant, an increase in the number of green investors, who refuse to hold the stock of Þrms with unreformed polluting technologies, means that the smaller number of neutral investors demand a higher expected return to compensate them for having to hold more of the polluting Þrms than they would otherwise hold. The higher expected return results from the polluting Þrm's share price falling below an acceptable Þrm's share price. If the price differential exceeds the cost of converting a polluting technology from unacceptable to acceptable, then some Þrms with polluting technolgies will reform, broadening once again the risk sharing opportunities, and shrinking the stock price differential. Thus, for any given proportion of green investors in the economy, we can calculate the equilibrium proportions of acceptable and unacceptable Þrms in the economy, determined by individual Þrms acting to maximize share price.
We illustrate these phenomena in numerical examples for a wide range of parameter values.
Comparative statics are performed, both analytically and numerically. For example, we initially assume a Þxed cost of reforming a polluting technology of 5% of the expected cash ßow to the Þrm.
If this cost is reduced to 1% of the expected cash ßow, then even a small proportion of green investors will cause some Þrms to reform their polluting technology. On the other hand, we start our base case by assuming that there are equal numbers of clean and polluting technologies before green investors appear. This is optimal from a risk sharing perspective with no green investors.
However, an interpretation of this assumption is that if a green investor appears, she would initially boycott 50% of the population of Þrms. Suppose we alter the starting distribution of technologies so that 75% are clean technologies before green investors appear. The risk sharing dislocation of this starting distribution of technologies is, however, much less disadvantageous to investors, so that converting technologies produces less diversiÞcation gain. With 75% starting clean technologies, we Þnd there must be over 60% green investors before any Þrm reforms its polluting technology.
Existing research regarding SRI examines both the reasons for such strategies and the evidence about performance of these strategies. Investors may choose to restrict their investment to green companies or mutual funds in "a desire for an integration of money into one's self" (Hamilton (1993) ). Alternatively, Wall (1995) argues, without an equilibrium model, that SRI can affect corporate investment by affecting the Þrm's cost of capital. However, he argues that such a result requires an inefficient capital market. We show such an effect while maintaining the assumption of an efficient capital market. Our model does not prescribe a motive for green investors, but rather estimates the impact that they may have acting for whatever reason they choose. Contrary to the existing literature, having an equilibrium model allows us to experiment with different parameter values to assess the potential impact of SRI.
Section 2 describes the model and its notation. The equilibrium and comparative statics are given in Section 3 and Section 4 provides a numerical example. We review others' investigations into the extent of green investing in Section 5, as well as review the evidence related to performance of green companies and mutual funds. Electing to "reform" in our model results from valuemaximizing Þrms reacting to changes in investors' required rates of return (i.e., the Þrms' costs of capital). Section 6 provides a conclusion.
The Model

Firms
We assume a one-period world in which there exist three categories of Þrms: acceptable (A) Þrms satisfy the investing criteria of the green investors; unacceptable (U ) Þrms do not satisfy green investors' criteria; reformed (R) Þrms previously did not satisfy green investors' creiteria, but have achieved acceptablility at a certain cost. All A Þrms have the same production technology and U and R Þrms share a common technology. That is, a Þrm that incurs a cost to switch from category U to category R retains its original production technology but takes some costly action that makes it acceptable to green investors. The total number of Þrms, N , consists of N A acceptable Þrms,
Each category A Þrm uses the clean technology and generates a normally distributed cash ßow with mean µ C and variance σ 2 C . The cash ßows of A Þrms are perfectly correlated with each other.
A Þrm of either category U or category R uses the polluting technology and generates a normally distributed cash ßow with mean µ P and variance σ 2 P . The cash ßows of these Þrms are perfectly correlated with each other. The covariance between the cash ßows of a category A Þrm and those of a category U or category R Þrm is σ CP .
In addition to the risky production technologies, there also exists a riskless asset in perfectly elastic supply with a rate of return normalized to zero. Borrowing is allowed but short selling of shares is prohibited. The latter restriction is required because of the simplifying assumption that the cash ßows of the U and R Þrms are perfectly correlated with each other.
Preferences
Investors differ in their tolerance of environmental damage. We assume that there are two investor types, i ∈ {g, n}. and return σ C and µ C , (ii) N U unacceptable polluting Þrms, with risk and return σ P and µ P and (iii) N R reformed Þrms also with risk and return σ P and µ P . As mentioned, σ CP denotes the covariance between the cash ßows of the two technologies.
To summarize, the total N Þrms can be divided by technologies (clean, polluting) as:
Alternatively, classifying Þrms by acceptability to green investors (acceptable, unacceptable, reformed) gives:
Since clean Þrms are acceptable and reformed Þrms retain the polluting technology,
3 Our assumption that all Þrms face the same cost, K, and that reforming is an all-or-none choice will be discussed in Section 5. 4 We have also solved for the equilibrium in which Þrms that reform take on the risk-return characteristics of the clean technology. This case is discussed in the conclusion.
Equilibrium
For Given Acceptabilities
The combination of normally distributed cash ßows and CARA preferences yields the utility functions:
where:
• x ik is the number of shares of Þrms of category k (k = A, U, R) held by a type i investor
• P k is the price per share of a Þrm of category k
• ω ik is the endowment of shares in Þrms of category k of a type i investor.
We now derive investors' optimal portfolio choices. Neutral investors allocate their wealth between unacceptable and clean Þrms. They do not Þnd it optimal to hold reformed (i.e., type R)
Þrms for the following reason. Firms endowed with a polluting technology will only invest K to become reformed if their share price subsequent to the investment exceeds that of unacceptable Þrms by the amount K. Since reformed Þrms have the same risk-return characteristics as unacceptable
Þrms but a higher share price, neutral investors do not hold shares of type R Þrms. Thus, neutral investors optimize U n with respect to x nA and x nU and optimally set x nR = 0. 5
By contrast, green investors hold only acceptable and reformed Þrms, and so optimize over x gA and x gR .
Therefore, the Þrst order conditions for a neutral investor's optimal portfolio holdings follow from taking the derivative of U n with respect to x nA and x nU , and can be written as:
Solving simultaneously yields a neutral investor's optimal portfolio holdings:
and
where
The Þrst order conditions for a green investor can be written as:
Solving simultaneously yields a green investor's optimal portfolio holdings:
Equilibrium share prices are derived by substituting the above optimal portfolio holdings in the following market clearing conditions:
allowed, neutral investors could make unlimited arbitrage proÞts by shorting reformed Þrms and buying unacceptable Þrms. This restriction on short selling is required solely because we assume that reformed Þrms retain the polluting technology. In a model with reformed Þrms assuming the clean technology, no short selling restriction is required. This alternative model, and why we chose not to use it to explain our result, is discussed in the conclusion.
The resulting equilibrium prices are:
We note for later results that equation (14) shows that the price of a share of an acceptable Þrm, P A , is independent of the number of green investors, I g . To see what causes this, we can take the total derivative of equations (11) through (13) with respect to I g . Because, in equation (12),
, the change in demand by investor n for U Þrms must equal, but with opposite sign, the change in demand by investor g for R Þrms (equation (13)). In equilibrium (where the change in P R must equal the change in P U ), the change in the demand function for U Þrms by investor n is equal to the change in demand by investor g for R Þrms. In addition, the demand functions for Þrm A by both investors n and g change with price in the same way. The only way these changes in demands can balance is for the price of A Þrms, which are the only Þrms held by both types of investors, to remain unchanged.
Optimal Corporate Acceptability Choice
The number of unacceptable Þrms that pay to become reformed either will be zero or will adjust until the price of reformed Þrms is equal to the price of unacceptable Þrms plus the cost of becoming reformed, K. That is,
Solving this equality for N R reveals:
A variable of particular interest is I * g , the minimum proportion of investors applying ethical investment screens required to induce the Þrst unacceptable polluting Þrm to become reformed. We
Þnd that I * g depends on the number of Þrms acceptable to green investors, the risk tolerance of investors, the covariance between the cash ßows produced by the two technologies and the cost of becoming reformed. Thus, we deÞne I * g as the value of I g at which N R becomes positive in equation (17). That is,
Comparative Statics
We examine how changing the model's parameters affects the number of reformed Þrms.
First, we show that N R is montonic in I g . Note from equation (17) that, as I g goes to zero, so does N R . Also, since dI g + dI n = 0, it is easy to see that N R goes to N − N C as I g goes to I.
Then, taking the total derivative of
increasing the number of green investors leads to a larger number of reformed Þrms. Holding the total number of investors constant, more green investors means that there are fewer neutral investors who are willing to hold unacceptable Þrms' shares. Lower demand for unacceptable Þrms'
shares due to an increasing number of green investors results in downward "price pressure" that reduces those shares' value, inducing more of them to pay K to become type R Þrms.
Next, it is clear from equation (17) that increasing the cost of reforming, K, leads to fewer unacceptable Þrms reforming.
Also, increasing the risk tolerance, τ , leads to a decrease in the number of reformed Þrms.
Reformed Þrms increase the diversiÞcation possibilities for the green investors, and this matters less if the green investors are more risk tolerant.
The number of reformed Þrms is a concave function of the covariance (and the correlation)
between the cash ßows of technologies P and C. This function has its unique maximum where the covariance is zero. To see this, we examine the special case in which technologies P and C have identical risk-return features and there are an equal number of Þrms with each technology. When the correlation is between these extremes, there are diversiÞcation gains to unacceptable
Þrms reforming, and these gains increase as the absolute value of the correlation approaches zero.
Finally, the number of reformed Þrms will vary with N C , the number of originally clean (acceptable) Þrms. From equation (17), it is clear that the number of reformed Þrms decreases with more acceptable Þrms. When there are many originally clean Þrms, there are few unacceptable
Þrms, implying a small diversiÞcation loss for green investors. This means that the share price of unacceptable Þrms is relatively high, providing little incentive to reform.
Unacceptable Þrms reform in order to increase their share price (i.e., reduce their cost of capital).
Given expected future cash ßow, µ j , j ∈ {C, P }, a Þrm's cost of capital,
is inversely related to its price, P k . Substituting the deÞnition of N R in equation (17) into the expression for P R , equation (16), yields
We can examine the comparative statics of P R with respect to the model parameters to determine how a reformed Þrm's cost of capital changes with model parameter changes.
First, a reformed Þrm's cost of capital decreases as the cost of reforming, K, increases. This is because a larger drop in the cost of capital is required to justify incurring a larger reforming cost.
Next, more green investors implies a higher cost of capital for reformed Þrms. For a Þxed number of investors, more green investors means fewer neutral investors, which in turn means a lower price for unacceptable Þrms. However, in equilibrium, the price of reformed Þrms is equal to the price of unacceptable Þrms plus K. Thus, a lower unacceptable Þrm price implies a lower reformed Þrm price, which implies a higher cost of capital for reformed Þrms.
Also, more risk tolerant investors quite obviously will provide a lower cost of capital for all
Þrms.
Finally, the cost of capital for reformed Þrms is monotonically increasing in the covariance between the technologies' cash ßows. Decreasing the diversiÞcation possibilities between the technologies raises all Þrms' cost of capital.
Numerical Examples
While the analytical results provide a number of insights, they do not give a feel for the magnitudes of the endogenous variables. For example, a critical variable is I * g , the number of green investors required to induce the Þrst unacceptable Þrm to reform, deÞned in (18).
The parameters used in our base case are:
• Technologies These parameters were chosen to produce reasonable Þrm costs of capital, i.e., expected rates of return. In addition, the variance-covariance matrix of cash ßows was chosen to produce empirically reasonable results for the standard deviation of rate of return.
We examine the effect of varying I g , the number of green investors, on three endogenous variables: (i) N R /(N − N C ), the number of reformed Þrms, as a percentage of the number of originally polluting (unacceptable) Þrms, (ii) (µ P /P U ) − 1, the cost of capital of unacceptable Þrms, and (iii) (µ P /P R ) − 1, the cost of capital of reformed Þrms.
Figures 1 through 3 show these relationships for the base case. Figure 2 shows that, when there are no green investors, the cost of capital for all Þrms is about 8%. Since the riskless rate has been normalized at zero, this expected return should be thought of as an equity risk premium. Figure   1 shows that green investors must constitute roughly 25% of the investor population in order to induce the Þrst unacceptable Þrm to reform. At that point, Figures 2 and 3 indicate that the cost of capital for unacceptable Þrms is about 9.5%, while for reformed Þrms, the cost of capital is only 3.9%. This large difference in costs of capital is required to induce an unacceptable Þrm to incur the cost of reforming, making it acceptable to green investors.
The curve in Figure 1 is convex, indicating that the marginal effect of additional green investors on reformed Þrms is increasing. Figures 2 and 3 show that more green investors raise the cost of capital of both unacceptable and reformed Þrms. As noted above, fewer neutral investors results in a lower price for unacceptable Þrms, and thus for reformed Þrms as well, pushing up both Þrms' costs of capital. Figure 4 shows how varying the reforming cost affects the number of reformed Þrms. At a reforming cost of 1% of the expected cash ßow (K = 0.1), I * g is zero, i.e., even a small number of green investors will produce some number of reformed Þrms. By contrast, a switching cost of 10% (K = 1.0) of expected cash ßow prevents any reforming until there are more than 60% green investors. At that point the difference in the cost of capital between unacceptable and reformed Þrms is quite large at approximately 13%, as opposed to a difference of only 5.6% in the base case. Figure 5 shows how the number of reformed Þrms is affected by N C , the number of originally acceptable Þrms. The base case has N C = 0.5, which represents 50% of all Þrms. If there were no green investors, P and C technologies had identical risk-return features, and Þrms could costlessly select their technology, then 50% of Þrms, i.e., N C = 0.5, would choose the green technology. We use the above to show that the derivative of WACC with respect to I g , when evaluated at I g = 0, changes only due to a change in P U . In the above equation, N C and N U are constant, N R = 0 and P A is unchanged because acceptable Þrms are held by both green and neutral investors.
However, as I g increases from zero, the risk-sharing opportunities are lessened because of the green investors' boycott of unacceptable Þrms, and so P U decreases, meaning that the WACC increases with I g at I g = 0.
We also note that, at I g = 0, WACC becomes N C µ C P A + N P µ P P U − 1 where, from the WACC deÞnition above, the middle term is zero and the last term has N U = N P .
Next, we evaluate WACC at I g = 1. In this case, all polluting Þrms become reformed (N R = N P and N U = 0), so that the third term in the WACC equation above becomes zero. Thus, WACC becomes N C µ C P A + N P µ P P R − 1. Moreover, P R at I g = 1 equals P U at I g = 0, since in both cases all investors are willing to hold all available Þrms. Therefore, WACC at I g = 0 equals WACC at I g = 1, as reßected in the numerical examples in Figure 6 .
Finally we indicate why the curves for N C = .50 and N C = .75 in Figure 6 appear different from the curve for N C = .25. When N C is large (e.g., 0.75), I * g is also large, meaning that there must be many green investors before the Þrst polluting Þrm switches to being reformed. For I g below I * g (about 0.60 for N C = .75 in Figure 6 ), the only effect of increasing I g is to lower P U , causing WACC to increase at an increasing rate. The rate of increase in WACC is reduced for I g > I * g because then, while P U is still decreasing, Þrms are now switching, thereby ameliorating the effect of the worsening risk-sharing. Thus, the WACC function appears convex when I g < I * g , but becomes concave after that. As demonstrated above, the WACC at I g = 1 must return to what it was when I g = 0.
Empirical Evidence in the Literature
Both the analytic comparative statics and the numerical examples indicate that the number of green investors in an economy does affect the proportion of acceptable, unacceptable and reformed Þrms in the economy and the costs of capital of those Þrms. Our model indicates that acceptable and reformed Þrms have lower costs of capital, i.e., lower expected rates of return, than unacceptable
Þrms when there are sufficient green investors in the market. For small proportions of green investors, acceptable and unacceptable Þrms have similar expected rates of return. As the number of green investors grows, the expected returns of unacceptable Þrms will be higher than the expected returns of reformed Þrms, given the same systematic risk for each Þrm.
In our numerical example we can calculate the expected returns and betas (relative to the market portfolio) of unacceptable, acceptable and reformed Þrms and plot them relative to the market portfolio, consisting of the equilibrium proportions of the three Þrms. This is the equivalent of the CAPM security market line. For any number of green investors, the implications of the altered risk-sharing lead to all three Þrms plotting off the security market line. Of course, these abnormal returns are not due to "superior" investment opportunities, but rather to the different "market prices of risk" investors demand from all three types of Þrms.
Because of the increased risk borne by neutral investors holding all the unacceptable Þrms, those Þrms lie above the security market line. In our base case numerical example, acceptable and reformed Þrms lie below the security market line. If there are a signiÞcant number of green investors, these deviations from the security market line should be detectable as risk-adjusted abnormal returns ("Jensen's alpha"), positive for unacceptable Þrms and negative for acceptable and reformed Þrms.
Are green investors having an impact on expected rates of return and corporate behavior?
Here we review existing evidence of the level, and performance, of socially responsible investing in the US. Harrington (1992, Using a proportion of assets under management of 10% as an empirical estimate of I g , the fraction of green investors, we can roughly calibrate our model parameters. In our base case, for example, no unacceptable (polluting) Þrms would reform (i.e., pay to become acceptable to green investors) if the proportion of green investors was 10% (see Figure 1 , where I * g is roughly 20%). If, however, we reduce the cost of reforming from 5% of expected cash ßow to 1% of expected cash ßow, then Figure 4 indicates that a proportion of 10% green investors would lead to about 10% of originally polluting Þrms reforming to be acceptable to green investors.
Thus, an important determinant of the impact of green investing is the cost of reforming.
However, it would appear quite difficult to measure K empirically. First, even if we could measure all "reforming" investment, it might be that some fraction of that investment would have been made regardless of the presence of green investors, as part of normal modernizing capital expenditures.
A parallel case is the fact that some "Y2K" investment would have been made even if it wasn't Y2K, inßating the true impact of the turn of the century. Second, some Þrms might see nonpecuniary beneÞts to reforming, effectively reducing their cost, K. So, empirical estimation of K seems difficult.
A downside to a 10% proportion of green investors in our model can be seen in Figure 6 . Raising the proportion of green investors from 5% to 10% in our model will actually raise the economy cost of capital, while not encouraging any Þrms to reform.
Our base case also assumed that the fraction of acceptable to unacceptable Þrms before introducing green investors was .50. If we assumed that the Þrst green investor, when applying an ethical screen, found only 25% of Þrms to be acceptable, then a 10% proportion of green investors would induce about 5% of the originally polluting Þrms to reform to be acceptable to green investors.
We have some indirect evidence on the proportion of Þrms that would pass ethical screens. Luck Alternatively, Herremans, et.al. (1993) Þnd that clean Þrms have higher proÞts and lower stock market risk. In addition, they Þnd signiÞcantly (at 5%) superior stock price performance for clean versus polluting Þrms in years 1984 through 1986 in idustries they classify as having "more social conßict." Years 1982 Years , 1983 Years and 1987 are not signiÞcant at the 5% level, and no years are signiÞcant for Þrm comparisons in industries classiÞed as having "less social conßict." White (1995b) classiÞes 97 NYSE or AMEX Þrms as "green," "oatmeal" or "brown" based upon their environmental reputation. He Þnds that the green Þrms have positive abnormal stock returns, but that the oatmeal and brown Þrms do not. Cohen, Fenn and Naimon (1995) get similar results.
Hart (1996) examines emission reductions accomplished by Þrms in 1989 and examines subsequent accounting proÞts for the Þrms. He Þnds, for example, that more emission reductions in 1989 lead to higher return on equity two and three years later. Hart (1996) points out the problem of causality in these types of tests. Does being "clean" raise proÞts and stock prices, or do successful Þrms, with higher proÞts and stock prices, undertake more "clean" activites because they can be afforded? It is hard to argue with the point that, if going "clean" raises proÞts, why doesn't every Þrm do just that?
As indicated above, few studies Þnd abnormal returns, and some that do Þnd positive abnormal returns for the acceptable and/or reformed Þrms. In general, the results of no abnormal returns are consistent with our model only if there are few green investors, so that both unacceptable and acceptable Þrms have similar (i.e., not empirically discernably different) expected returns.
An interesting implication of our model concerns the impact of future growth in green investing.
As noted above, more green investors implies a growing gap between the expected returns to neutral investors and green investors in a way that favors the neutral investors. If higher average returns shift wealth to neutral investors, then new green investors could be seen as engaging in self-defeating behavior: more green investors yields higer average returns to neutral investors, shifting more wealth over time back to neutral investors. This "wealth effect' diminshes the impact of green investors.
Conclusion
Exclusionary social investment strategies are shown to alter risk sharing opportunities so that polluting (unacceptable) Þrms' share prices are lowered. When the price differential between acceptable and unacceptable Þrms grows large enough, it becomes optimal for unacceptable Þrms to pay the (assumed) Þxed cost of reforming (i.e., making themselves acceptable to green investors).
Thus, social investing can affect corporate behavior. A change in risk sharing as green investing increases causes the economy-wide cost of capital to change in a non-monotonic way, with the cost of capital reaching a maximum when investable funds are equally split between green investing and non-green investing.
As noted above, our model requires a short selling restriction on neutral investors because reformed Þrms retain the same technology as unacceptable Þrms, but have a different price than unacceptable Þrms. The necessity for the short selling restriction is removed if we assume that reformed Þrms take on the clean technology. In this case, P R = P A , so that Þrms with the same technology have the same price; there are no arbitrage opportunities. We have solved this model and the qualitative results are unchanged.
We chose to exposit our results with the model where reformed Þrms retain their original technology (the "original model") because it avoids an additional factor that appears when reformed Þrms change technologies (the "alternative model"). In the original model, the proportion of clean and polluting technologies is Þxed, regardless of how many Þrms reform. This Þxes the diversiÞca-tion beneÞts available to investors, independent of the proportion of reformed Þrms in the economy.
In the alternative model, however, the split between clean and polluting technologies varies with N R . Thus, the alternative model has an additional "diversiÞcation factor" in determining how many Þrms will reform. To avoid clouding the issue with this additional diversiÞcation effect, we use the original model with the short selling constraint.
Our simple model assumes all Þrms are the same. In reality, some industries are primarily clean (i.e., acceptable), and some are mostly polluting (unacceptable). This type of differentiation could be incorporated in our model by varying the cost of reforming. Mostly polluting industries would consist of Þrms with a high reforming cost, and mostly clean industries would contain Þrms with low reforming costs.
